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1. INTRODUCTION 
When considering international aid, the views of the recipients are not taken much into 
account. Despite the well established tradition of domestic and international aid the overall 
perception of the aid endeavour are rarely focused on. This paper seeks to describe the way 
how a given group of aid beneficiaries, Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
think and feel about international assistance – foreign aid received from donor countries who 
are members of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) – and tries to reflect 
their voices and opinions. 
 
The international community has been supporting attempts to foster peace between the 
Israelis and Palestinians since the early 1990s. Palestinians have received the highest average 
annual official development assistance (ODA) per capita since the beginning of the Oslo 
Peace Process for building their system of institutions and developing their economy. 
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Measured by ODA per capita, the peace process as well as the Palestinian national concerns 
seem to have been taken into consideration quite generously by the donor community: 
 
Table 1. Net ODA received per capita (current USD), selected countries (1972-2008) 
Country 1972 1973 1979 1980 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2002 2004 2005 2007 2008 
Middle East                   
Egypt, Arab Rep. 3 20 33 31 85 39 31 30 23 18 17 20 13 14 17 
Iraq 2 1 2 1 28 8 15 10 3 5 4 167 774 307 322 
Israel1 27 57 313 230 353 241 61 - - - - - - - - 
Jordan 63 112 619 585 265 79 129 104 92 91 107 114 123 93 128 
West Bank and 
Gaza - - - - - 79 201 223 178 280 502 323 312 489 659 
Yemen, Rep. of 7 8 43 68 23 22 11 21 26 23 30 12 14 11 13 
Europe                   
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina - - - - - 11 277 256 289 170 149 181 141 120 128 
Asia                   
Afghanistan 4 4 7 2 27 11 10 11 6 17 52 88 105 140 168 
Timor-Leste - - 1 1 1 1 0 1 188 233 253 170 186 261 253 
Vietnam 13 10 7 5 3 4 11 13 18 18 16 23 23 29 30 
Africa                   
Angola 0 0 6 7 25 25 33 27 28 19 27 71 25 14 20 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
of 6 6 16 16 12 4 4 3 3 5 22 32 30 20 26 
Kenya 6 8 22 24 38 35 27 15 10 14 12 19 21 35 35 
Mozambique 0 0 12 14 77 79 67 56 46 51 115 61 62 81 89 
Rwanda 7 9 29 30 52 60 128 37 50 37 42 56 64 76 96 
Source: World Bank (2010)  
 
Looking at the data presented in Table 1, it is clear that Palestinians are over-represented 
among the aid beneficiaries. The exceptionally high amount disbursed may imply that their 
views, opinion and preferences on aid are taken into account more than in any other recipient 
country. However, as our findings prove, this is not the case. Palestinian perceptions on 
foreign aid, on its role and necessity have been ignored by donor countries by and large.   
 
Related research on perceptions about foreign aid  
Even if much has been written on the objectives, roles, functions and measures of 
international (Western) assistance devoted to solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Khadr 
1999; Hooper 1999; Brynen 2000; Nakhleh 2004; Keating et al 2005; Le More 2008), the way 
1 Israel has been given 2.5 to 3 billion USD per annum in the form of military and economic aid from the United 
States since the 1970s. However, due to the level of its development (measured by GNI/capita), Israel has not 
been entitled to official development assistance (ODA) from the U.S. since 1997. 
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how the Palestinians think about and reflect on its meaning, roles and efficiency has received 
little attention. Only one survey conducted by the Development Studies Program at Bir Zeit 
University (DSP) in 2004 can be cited, results of which were summarized by Nader Said 
(2005). The original public opinion poll focused on the impact of international assistance as 
perceived by Palestinians. Building on these data and focusing on the broad concept of human 
security, Said concluded that ‘Palestinian development efforts and achievements have been 
destroyed by external factors’ (Said 2005). Indeed, the effects of foreign aid channelled in the 
form of official development and humanitarian assistance has failed ‘to buy peace’ and has 
become increasingly questioned by Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. An 
opinion poll conducted by Fafo AIS in 2008 found that ‘[a] majority of Palestinians thought 
Western financial assistance to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA or PA) was doing 
more harm than good; two thirds (69%) of those polled in February and March 2008 believed 
that aid to the PA contributed to widening the rift between Fatah and Hamas. A similar 
proportion (63%) thought that aid to the PA promoted corruption. An equally significant 
number of respondents was convinced that aid had very little or no effect on poverty 
alleviation’ (Fafo 2008). These findings were in tune with related Palestinian perceptions 
captured by other polling institutes earlier (CPRS 1999a; CPRS 1999b; CPRS 2000; Bir Zeit 
DSP 2004). Although Palestinian society has become increasingly suspicious of the donors’ 
good intentions since the 1990s, their perceptions seem to be quite heterogeneous regarding 
the necessity and efficiency of external help. While two thirds of Palestinians agreed that 
foreign aid was needed because it alleviated human suffering, a similar proportion felt that it 
also helped donors impose their national goals as well as helped Israel maintain the 
occupation (Fafo 2010a). Since none of the referred research tried to explore the concepts and 
notions – what foreign aid means to the Palestinian recipients – it was worthwhile exploring 
the Palestinian mental image of foreign aid. 
 
Research questions and objectives 
To learn more about the Palestinian perceptions on foreign aid, the author of this paper 
conducted a research in cooperation with Fafo AIS, a Norwegian research institute in 2010. 
The research leaned on earlier Fafo public opinion polls (Fafo 2008; Fafo 2010a; Fafo 2010b) 
and sought to identify sentiments and perceptions experienced by Palestinians (Paragi 2010). 
Core research questions included the following: How do Palestinians think about international 
(i.e. Western) assistance? How has the Palestinian society reached the conclusion that aid is 
doing more harm than good? What has formed their opinions? Does the way of thinking vary 
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by societal characteristics and political affiliation? And last but not least, why do Palestinians 
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip think the way they do? To answer these questions, it was 
required to explore what international donor activities mean to Palestinians; what the main 
sources of their knowledge are; what, if any, direct, personal experiences they have (had) with 
international donors and foreign assistance; and how they consider the political role of 
international aid to the West Bank and Gaza Strip both in intra-Palestinian terms and vis-à-vis 
Israel. Finding answers to these questions enhanced the understanding of how Palestinians 
generally think about external assistance (Paragi 2010). This paper aims to summarize only 
the impressions and feelings exhibited by the Palestinians interviewed as well as the roles and 
functions they attached to foreign aid. 
 
2. DATA AND METHODS  
To capture and measure local perceptions on Western assistance, a series of individual in-
depth interviews and a few focus group interviews were conducted in the Palestinian 
territories in July and August 2010. The research was partly based on a series of surveys and 
opinion polls carried out earlier by Fafo in the period of 2005 to 2010 in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip.2 The questions formulated in the interview guide took into consideration the fact 
that the function and effects of international assistance had been quite controversial (Fafo 
2008; Fafo 2010a; Fafo 2010b). 
 
Perceptions are important because people make personal as well as community decisions 
based on the perceptions construed by them. Throughout the research they were understood as 
a kind of sensation, a way of gaining experiences by sensing the world around us (Goldstein 
2009). This perceptual process is an active, but not necessarily conscious process by which 
individuals ‘gather and interpret information about the external and internal environments’ 
and ‘organize and interpret their sensory impressions in order to give meaning to their 
environment’ (Robbins 2009: 119). In other words, perception was seen as a process of 
attaining awareness or understanding the information sensed. It included evaluation too, even 
if people were not necessarily aware of the difference between their perception and reality.  
 
2 See Fafo’s website containing the results: http://www.fafo.no/ais/middeast/opt/index.htm 
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Since perceptions do not necessarily comply with reality, they may be misleading, causing 
non-intended effects as long as they can lead to wrong decisions and choices.3 As emphasized 
by Fred Halliday writing on the international relations of the Middle East: ‘the hold of beliefs, 
and perceptions, on a people may [...] be the greater where the ideas in question take the form 
not of formal doctrines, or novel political terms, but of more everyday and unquestioned 
assumptions that nonetheless affect political values and choices’ (Halliday 2002: 221). 
Equally, perceptions of international assistance contain such ’knowledge’ and ‘assumptions’ 
that have been collected by Palestinians related to this issue for the past decades. Whether 
these perceptions comply with facts or not is secondary, at least if one accepts the notion 
formulated by American sociologist William I. Thomas that ‘if men define situations as real, 
they are real in their consequences’ (cited by Volkart 1951: xxx). Palestinians, just as people 
anywhere in the world, draw conclusions and make individual, societal and political decisions 
in tune with their perceptions and convictions. Understanding them better is important not 
only for the people concerned, but to anyone being interested in the Israeli-Palestinian 
question. 
 
2.1. Data collection and respondents’ profiles 
During the research period (2010) mainly qualitative methods were used. However, to learn 
more about the general sentiments regarding earlier results of international aid, quantitative 
interviews were also utilized. A Fafo public opinion poll containing several relevant questions 
was carried out in the West Bank from 9 to 15 February and in the Gaza Strip from 8 to 12 
May 2010. Interviews took place at 66 fieldwork points in both areas. The respondents were 
randomly selected individuals aged 18 and above: 960 in the West Bank and 933 in the Gaza 
Strip, all interviewed face to face.4 These structured interviews were conducted in Arabic; 
results were published by Fafo in June 2010 (Fafo 2010a).  
 
To explore the logic behind the general perceptions revealed by the Fafo opinion polls open-
ended, more in-depth individual and group interviews were used. The qualitative research 
was concerned with the opinions, experiences and feelings of individual Palestinians, and its 
main objective was to clarify what international assistance means to members of the 
3 Note, that comparing the perceived to ‘the real’ was not the aim of the research. 
4 On the sample design, see Zhang (2010a, 2010b).  
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Palestinian society and to understand local interpretations of foreign assistance.5 Data was 
collected through direct encounters with Palestinian individuals. All in all 21 in-depth 
individual and 3 mini focus group interviews were conducted in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip in July and August 2010. As far as the group interviews were concerned, three 
subgroups of society were approached: refugees both in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and a 
group of ordinary citizens in the Gaza Strip. The groups were limited to three participants 
(plus the moderator) in order to facilitate everyone’s active participation and interaction. The 
interviews were conducted in Arabic. The transcripts were translated to English by the two 
interviewers, both of them local Fafo staff. All interviews were semi-structured containing a 
series of open-ended questions concentrating on three main areas: (i) basic concepts and local 
interpretations of international assistance; (ii) past and present experiences with foreign aid 
and future expectations regarding its role and impact; and (iii) the perceived priorities of 
Western foreign assistance with reference to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The interviewers 
both in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip had the opportunity to engage the respondents in 
an ‘informal’ conversation as well as to urge them to elaborate on their original response in 
order to encourage them to reflect further on the question or topic at hand.  
 
To the qualitative interviews we sought to recruit people with knowledge of and interest in 
international assistance. The respondents were all men between 30 and 60 years of age (mean 
age close to 50). Their places of living (and that of work) were Ramallah, Bethlehem and 
Gaza City. All of them had some solid experience with the dynamics of foreign assistance 
channelled to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. For additional information indicative of their 
professional background and experience with foreign aid, see Table 2.6  
 
Table 2. Respondents of qualitative interviews 
 West Bank Gaza Strip 
Senior PNA employee 2 1 
Business people/owners 2 1 
Academics 3 2 
Local NGO leaders / NGO 2 1 
5 While the term ‘foreign aid’ covers military, humanitarian as well development assistance in general sense, it 
was used as an equivalent of international assistance or development aid (or that of official development 
assistance, ODA) during the interviews as well as upon presenting the results. The applied Arabic equivalent was 
al-musaadat al-dawlia (ةیلودلا تادعاسملا). 
6 More information about the background of the respondents’ is found in the annex of Paragi (2010). 
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employees 
International NGO leaders / staff 2 - 
Hamula heads, tribal judges 1 2 
Ordinary people - Group of 3 
Refugees living in camps Group of 3 Group of 3 
Refugee camp head 1 1 
Total 16 14 
 
To facilitate smooth interviews, the respondents’ political affiliation or voting preferences 
were not recorded, but the recruiting process aimed at finding respondents with political 
leanings reflecting the diversity of the Palestinian political scene. Answers were collected 
through face-to-face interviews during which the interviewers did their outmost to create a 
relaxed and comfortable atmosphere. However, since the conversations were recorded and 
notes taken, on one occasion an interviewee felt a bit uneasy and was hesitant to express his 
real thoughts. Apart from this one experience, the respondents were quite responsive, and 
some even eager, to share their opinions with us and discuss the given subject. 
 
Sources of the respondent’s knowledge 
While it varied with their background and professional and institutional affiliation, the 
Palestinian respondents relied mainly on the following sources of information for knowledge 
on foreign aid: donor websites as well as that of the PNA Ministry of Planning, local media, 
TV stations and news papers; annual reports of foundations and NGOs; workshops and 
lectures; ministries and information from cabinet meetings. It was noticed by many that 
international donors raised signs (billboards) at the venues of projects that they sponsored: ‘if 
the EU [or any other donor] were to fund the building of a school they would announce it in 
the local media outlets. They would also normally place signs that hold the donors’ names and 
mention the institutions that worked on the project.’ Civil society organizations and public 
employees were also mentioned during the interviews. Although the picture in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip was comparable, it was remarked that ‘in Gaza we suffer from a critical 
shortage of reliable data and information. In the past, we could get information from the 
Central Bureau of Statistics. But today the Bureau is shut down because of the political 
situation, leaving us without this important [source of] information.’ Books and scientific 
publications were rarely mentioned, if at all, but their main messages and conclusions were 
known to respondents being familiar with academic work on international assistance to the 
Palestinians.   
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 2.2. Data analysis 
The available data was processed by means of simple statistical analysis (quantitative 
interviews) as well as by analyzing the content of the qualitative interviews. The poll results 
were used to explore general Palestinian experiences with international assistance, and 
especially to examine how geographical factors, political affiliation and other factors 
influence people’s opinions on foreign aid (Fafo 2010a).  
 
The transcripts of individual and group interviews were processed by the means of manual 
content analysis (Hancock 1998, 2002; Babbie 2010: 333-343). After the relevant statements 
of the interview transcripts had been listed and their meaning had been determined, the data 
were sorted into the major and minor categories depicted in Table 3 in order to identify the 
structure of international assistance as understood by Palestinians. 
 
Table 3. Major and minor categories applied during the content analysis 
1. Basic concepts and 
local interpretations* 
The meaning of the concept of 
international assistance (IA) 
Roles and functions 
Impressions and feelings 
The roles and functions of IA  
Eras of IA  
General features of Western assistance  
2. Quality of aid Personal experiences with assistance  
‘Domestic’ or ‘indigenous’ assistance Various forms 
Comparison with IA 
Assessment of PNA aid 
 
Infrastructure 
Public services 
Assessment of UNRWA aid Political role and future 
Public services 
Food aid 
3. Politics of aid Dependency On the donor’s agenda 
On Israeli policies 
Interest in maintaining the status quo   
Intra-Palestinian relations and IA Palestinian responsibility 
Legitimacy of the recipients 
Fayyad-government (and IA) 
Haniye-government (and IA) 
Israeli-Palestinian relations and IA Dependency 
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Maintaining the occupation 
The future of the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip  
Donor-Palestinian relations and IA Conditionality** 
Priorities of Western foreign 
assistance 
Relationship and coordination 
among the concerned actors 
* This paper deals only with categories marked in bold. 
** On conditionality see: Paragi (2012) 
 
Having read the interview transcripts, three main groups and subgroups of opinions could be 
identified by coding and classification of the qualitative data, i.e. the thoughts recorded by the 
interviewers (Table 3). The categories and codes in the Table reflect the mental image of 
international assistance as perceived by the Palestinians – at least by those we interviewed.  
 
This paper contains the results gained by summarizing and analyzing qualitative data with 
reference to the basic concepts and local interpretations of international assistance. The 
profession or the institutional affiliation, just as any other characteristics of the respondents, 
are displayed in those cases in which the given opinion could be explained somehow by the 
interviewees’ personal ‘conduct’. Inverted commas mark the exact wording and the most apt 
formulation chosen from the recorded responses.  
 
3. RESEARCH RESULTS 
Members of the international community – understood as the Western countries, OECD DAC 
(and non-DAC) donors providing development and humanitarian aid to Palestinians  – were 
considered to be active participants in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by putting conditions on 
aid to one side only, namely the Palestinian side. Setting conditions may have aimed at 
improving the Palestinian institutional capacity to absorb foreign aid and complying with the 
developments of the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations since 2003. However, it was more 
often understood as an expression of foreign political self-interest. The donors’ support to the 
peace process was primarily perceived as something which aimed at being visible and 
asserting their own interests, let this interest mean altruistic support for a just cause or a less 
altruistic move to achieve foreign policy goals. The frustration and hopelessness experienced 
by the Palestinians were direct results of the slow (if any) progress on the Israeli-Palestinian 
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negotiations about a Palestinian state. Under the given political circumstances international 
assistance was considered to be a mechanism supporting the Israeli occupation and oppression 
instead of representing real political will of the donor countries aiming at changing the status 
quo.  
 
Palestinians respondents were asked to name what (first) comes to their mind upon hearing 
the term ‘international assistance’ (foreign aid). What feelings and thoughts have become 
attached to the term throughout the years, and what does it evoke today? The answers were 
grouped under two main headings. While the section titled ‘impressions and feelings’ seeks to 
embrace and present all those emotional expressions and sentiments that were associated with 
‘foreign aid’ (section 3.1.), the section labelled ‘roles and functions’ contains perceptions on 
foreign aid, i.e. how it was interpreted and perceived to intervene and interfere in Palestinian 
domestic affairs (section 3.2.). 
 
3.1. Impressions and feelings 
Both quantitative interviews (Fafo 2010a) and qualitative surveys (Fafo 2010b; Paragi 2010) 
sought to capture the immediate feelings and first reactions of the people to the term 
‘international assistance.’ Palestinians interviewed during the public opinion poll were asked 
to decide whether they agreed (or not) with any of the four statements formulated in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Perceptions on international assistance 1 (impressions and feelings) 
 
Positive 
feeling, 
it is 
always 
good to 
get help 
Makes 
me 
feel 
more 
secure 
It is only 
compensation 
from those 
responsible 
for the 
situation 
Humiliation, 
it hurts my 
self-respect 
(personal 
pride) 
Do not 
agree 
with any 
statement 
N 
           
Total 53 42 65 65 3 1 787 
Main 
region 
West Bank 49 38 63 67 3 876 
Gaza Strip 60 49 69 62 3 911 
Type of 
living area 
Urban 52 42 69 62 3 668 
Rural 53 40 60 69 3 525 
Camp 55 47 70 59 3 594 
Highest 
education 
completed 
Not completed 
elementary 
63 54 61 62 2 215 
Elementary 57 48 63 65 4 264 
Intermediate 58 44 70 65 3 507 
10 
Secondary 52 41 69 63 2 476 
More than secondary 40 32 57 69 7 324 
Percent of respondents 18 years and above that agree with the statement. 
Source: (Fafo 2010a: Table 1.3) 
 
As Table 4 shows, nearly two thirds of the respondents agreed with the statement that foreign 
aid was a form of compensation from those countries that could be held responsible for the 
situation. An equal proportion of Palestinian adults considered it humiliating, something that 
hurts their sense of pride and worth. Overall, the data did not identify any population group 
with feelings that deviated significantly from others, on average. Yet, place of residence, 
educational attainment and economic standing have moderate impact on some aspects of the 
people’s perception. While receiving foreign aid was appreciated by 53% of the Palestinian 
population as ‘it is always good to get help,’ a higher proportion of the inhabitants of the Gaza 
Strip held this opinion (60%) than those of the West Bank (49%). Four in ten respondents 
agreed that aid ‘makes me feel more secure’. A higher proportion of people with limited 
schooling than among the well-educated, and who considered themselves among the poor 
rather than the well-to-do welcomed international assistance as something they felt good 
about, and which instilled a sense of security.  
 
Completing the picture, qualitative data gained from the semi-structured interviews revealed 
that international assistance evoked reactions that could be labeled thus: (i) feeling of being a 
victim, (ii) beggar mentality, (iii) hypocrisy, and (iv) interstate power relations.  
 
The sense of victimhood was of two sorts: Palestinians either looked at themselves as victims 
of the victim (the Jews) or that of the whole world. As far as the latter is concerned they felt to 
be ‘the [direct] victims of Europe that attempted to rid itself from the Jews in World War II. 
Anything that the EU gives us is the minimum compensation for the injustice they have 
imposed upon us.’7  
 
Albeit in an indirect way the former approach referred to the Western responsibility too. 
Making the Palestinians the victim of the victim was perceived to be ‘the policy of the West. 
[Palestinians and Israelis] are both the victims of the West.’ With reference to this 
‘victimhood,’ some Palestinians even acknowledged that the large amount of aid channeled to 
7 Interview, Bethlehem, August 1, 2010, tribal judge and head of political awareness (WB-4). 
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the them was directly related to the fact that the ‘Jewish question’ – composed of the Jewish 
intellectual contribution to the Western civilization on the one hand and the simultaneous 
problem of anti-Semitism on the other one – was exceptionally important in the Western world. 
As one respondent put it: ‘They [the Jews/Israelis] have such influence that cannot be denied in 
the world. Fortunately or not very much so, this gets us a lot of attention that we would not get 
otherwise. This makes the Palestinian-Israeli conflict a more popular destination for aid.’ 8 
 
Respondents expressed tangible bitterness over the fact that Palestinian society was turned 
into a society of beggars, since aid ‘created the culture of asking for money,’ which ‘made us 
weaker.’ Self-critical voices, especially in Gaza, went even further saying that ‘the people in 
Gaza receive some sort of aid and they don’t want to work [...] They go from one organization 
to the next looking for aid, applying for aid even though they are capable of working. 
Although job opportunities remain limited/scarce, the situation is better now [August 2010] 
than before. I think these people could get jobs, which even if not lucrative are better than 
begging for aid.’9 
 
The notion of hypocrisy was closely related to people’s perception of the ‘games of politics’. 
As long as the ‘US and the other donors cannot and do not change the politics, that is their 
support to Israel, [so] they give the Palestinians money [instead].’ As it was put bluntly by a 
respondent in the West Bank: ‘[i]f we were to ask the donors to boycott the Israeli 
government because it contains a figure as radical as Avigdor Liebermann, they [the donors 
and Israel] would riot.’ Our respondent regarded the donors as hypocritical actors of the 
political game, inasmuch as these countries have been aware of the ‘facts on the ground’ for 
decades. As it was also remarked during discussions with Palestinian politicians that escorted 
a public opinion poll last year (Fafo 2010b: 7), ‘[w]e are bored and tired of writing reports to 
the international community; they know everything, perhaps better than us, but what do you 
do? Why do you come here but do nothing?’10  
 
It was also very clear that many Palestinians objected to the way Western governments have 
been dealing with the region in general. On the one hand, they disliked the democratic West 
for cooperating with less democratic regimes preying on their own people: ‘[t]he mistake of 
8 Interview with a businessman, Bethlehem, August 6, 2010 
9 Interview with an employee working in a ministry, Buraj Camp, Gaza Strip, August 16, 2010  
10 Fafo (2010b) 
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the US and the Europeans is that they cooperate with corrupt dictatorships. If you look at the 
neighboring Arab states, this is the case. They are not democratic, and the West supports 
them.’11 On the other hand all this made some part of the Arabic public opinion including the 
Palestinians, who detest the West because they feel oppressed as well as being taken 
advantage of by their own fellows: ‘donors made [the Palestinians] hate the PNA [...] because 
they made corruption easy when they did not ask for feedback [any report on the money 
spent] until 2004. Additionally, any money that is given to the security forces is a form of 
corruption, since it is targeted against the [Palestinian] people.’12 
 
The people’s initial statements on ‘foreign aid’ were rarely formulated in a positive manner. It 
was only in the Gaza Strip that respondents attributed constructive functions to external 
assistance, emphasizing that it could play a significant role in assisting those living there.   
 
3.2. Roles and functions of foreign aid  
The 2010 poll showed that half of society—51% of the respondents in the West Bank and 
49% of those living in the Gaza Strip—thought that foreign aid buttressed the Palestinian case 
(Table 5). While a majority (79%) was convinced that it alleviated human suffering, many 
respondents (63%) also agreed that it made the burden of corruption easier to bear. These 
positive functions or effects of aid were shaded by the fact that two thirds of the respondents 
considered international assistance as a tool helping the donor countries impose their own 
policies/political objectives. Furthermore, nearly as many (61%) thought that foreign aid to 
the Palestinians was in effect making it easier for Israel to sustain the occupation.  
 
Table 5. Perceptions of international assistance II (roles and functions) 
 
Help the 
Palestinian 
cause 
Help our 
country 
bear the 
burden of 
corruption 
Help ease the 
human 
suffering of 
the 
Palestinians 
Help 
donor 
countries 
impose 
their aims 
Help Israel 
continue 
the 
occupation 
Do not 
agree to 
any 
statement 
N 
       
Total 50 63 79 68 62 3 1 823 
Main region 
West Bank 51 60 75 70 63 3 903 
Gaza Strip 49 67 85 65 59 3 920 
11 Note that the interviews took place half a year before the ‘Arab Spring.’ 
12 Interview with a community leader in a refugee camp, Betlehem, July 28, 2010 
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Type of 
living area 
Urban 47 61 75 72 65 4 679 
Rural 54 63 80 64 59 3 547 
Camp 44 67 83 69 62 2 597 
Highest 
education 
completed 
Not 
completed 
elementary 
51 68 81 59 56 1 212 
Elementary 52 62 73 64 57 4 272 
Intermediate 56 64 83 62 58 2 519 
Secondary 46 62 77 73 65 4 484 
More than 
secondary 
46 61 79 74 67 2 335 
Percent of respondents 18 years and above that agree with the statement. 
Source: (Fafo 2010a: Table 1.3) 
 
Answers were to some extent determined by political affiliation. Pro-Fatah respondents were 
less critical than Hamas-voters regarding the potential roles played by foreign aid. While 56% 
of those who said they would vote for Fatah appreciated international (Western) assistance 
because it benefits the Palestinian cause, only 40% of those favoring Hamas did so. Similarly, 
while 66% of the potential Fatah-voters felt that ‘foreign aid helps the county in bearing the 
burden of corruption’, while 59% of those affiliated with Hamas agreed with this statement. 
On some of the other items the gap between Fatah and Hamas followers was also about 10 
percentage points. For example, 74% of those who would vote for Hamas ‘if elections were 
held now’ were convinced that foreign aid served the policies of donors, 65% of Fatah-
sympathizers held the same opinion. People with relatively better economic conditions and 
higher education showed a weak tendency to be more critical than other Palestinians, but the 
general picture is one where the difference in perceptions across groups is statistically 
insignificant. The poll did not find variation across gender and age groups (not shown here) 
either. 
 
The qualitative interviews confirmed some of the findings of the poll but found that 
Palestinians attributed additional functions to foreign aid too. Foreign aid was seen as (i) 
external help easing sufferings, (ii) a way of control, (iii) a means to achieve certain related 
and various distant political goals, (iv) a reward for good performance, (v) compensation 
deserved by Palestinians, and (vi) a means to maintain the Israeli occupation (see this last 
function later). 
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Foreign aid was considered to be help mostly in Gaza where respondents deemed external 
assistance to be in accordance with their officially declared goals. According to the Gazans, 
international assistance aimed to improve the life of Palestinians and to develop the capacities 
of Palestinian society in social, health and educational terms; it aimed at enabling the PNA to 
pay salaries to its employees, to build roads, hospitals and schools. According to these 
perceptions, international assistance included all activities aimed at economic development 
and at helping people escape poverty.  
 
There were similar views captured by the interviews in the West Bank, but respondents there 
interpreted aid seen as help more critically. Unlike in Gaza, foreign aid was considered to be a 
sort of medicine which could ‘treat the symptoms, but [not] cure the disease.’ Aid was mere 
charity providing physical survival, while ‘aid organizations are only saving [the Palestinians] 
from death while not allowing [them] to prosper.’ The difference between the two approaches 
lied in the evaluation of its effects and efficiency. While foreign aid could make a difference 
to people in the Gaza Strip by rebuilding what had been visibly destroyed by Israel, it could 
not remove the main barriers to progress in the West Bank. The structure of the occupation, 
the classification of the West Bank into zones A, B, C, could never be challenged by foreign 
aid, as it was echoed by Palestinian opinions.  
 
Interviews suggested that it was quite common to see foreign aid as the simplest way to 
control Palestinian national aspirations, which served both the donors’ interests and those of 
Israel. This control function equally had positive and negative interpretation. To some extent 
foreign aid was not even considered as aid: as stated by one respondent: ‘I don’t think of it as 
aid. I think that this is the world’s duty towards the establishment of the Palestinian state. This 
is reality and it is not charity.’13 
 
According to a respondent living in the West Bank, development and humanitarian aid were 
equally used ‘to control and subdue [the Palestinians]’ inasmuch as ‘donors control every 
aspect of [their] lives.’ It was even more interesting that others looked at international 
assistance as something comparable to Israeli and Western notions on the objective and 
13 Interview with a businessman, Bethlehem, August 17, 2010. 
15 
                                                 
function of Palestinian economic development.14 As long as the Palestinians are ‘happy and 
rich’, they do not become suicide bombers, which way of thinking ‘makes [the donors] really, 
dangerously in line with Israel.’ In the view of the respondents, international aid served Israeli 
interests as long as it contributed significantly to cover Palestinian needs and exempted Israel 
from fulfilling its duties as the occupier. 
 
Foreign aid was widely seen by respondents both in the Gaza Strip and West Bank as a 
method ‘to pressure the PNA’ to accept certain things which hurt Palestinian national 
aspirations and help Israel. A related popular term was the ‘bargaining chip’, according to 
which: ‘the donations stop [...] whenever political pressure needs to be put on the [Palestinian] 
government.’15 
 
Donor countries have never tried to influence Israeli policies since it has always been much 
simpler to ‘pressure the PNA’ by providing assistance to it, people thought. Steps of political 
progress vis-à-vis Israel were seen as proof that the PNA-government led by Salam Fayyad 
and president Mahmoud Abbas had been forced to move ahead by foreign aid. 
 
Others looked at aid as a means to achieve various, occasionally non-related donor goals 
mainly in West Bank. Visibility was widely perceived as vanity, a sort of desire that recipients 
‘could read the name of the donating country on the bottom of the medicine boxes.’ There are 
‘many countries that want the publicity/visibility more than the real work’ that should be done 
in order to assist the Palestinians. Some [donor countries, organizations], said one of the 
respondents, just want to achieve something on their own to claim all the credit ‘in order to 
satisfy their funders [at home] and convince them of success to get additional donations.’ 
Palestinians asserted that certain donors (official agencies or NGOs) exert great efforts only 
14 The Oslo Accords were based on a traditionally Western way of thinking, on the importance of economic 
utility and rationality in human decisions. The interim period and the gradual transfer of powers were expected 
(supposed) to provide a proper background for Palestinians to moderate their political stance due to experiencing 
meaningful improvement in their daily lives. Initiatives since Camp David (1978) have been built on the 
assumption that ‘happy Palestinians with jobs and steady income from employment […] and with a functioning 
administrative structure at the local level, would be willing to negotiate for political settlement, even under 
occupation’ (Nakhleh 2004: 178; Ben-Ami 2006: 317). The original words of the Preamble of the first Camp 
David Framework for Peace demonstrate this view ‘[p]eace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and political independence of every state in the area […]. Progress toward that goal can accelerate 
movement toward a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic 
development, in maintaining stability and in assuring security” (quoted in Laqueur and Rubin 2001). The same 
conviction seemed to have been adopted by the PLO/Fatah upon negotiating and signing the DoP as well as 
promoted by the international (Western) donor community. 
15 Interview with a senior member of the Palestinian Legislative Council, Bethlehem, August 7, 2010. 
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‘to satisfy certain internal and/or external pressures from their respective governments to 
donate.’ As mirrored by Palestinian perceptions being in the aid business could be interpreted 
as a kind of vanity on the donor side.  
 
Foreign aid was widely perceived as a sort of reward or a kind of compensation. While the 
difference is a matter of definition, the essence was that Palestinian efforts, contributions or 
‘sacrifices’ were rightfully acknowledged by Western countries and followed up with 
assistance. In the words of a respondent in Gaza, it is a reward since ‘international aid is given 
to [those Palestinians] that agreed to the negotiations.’ In this sense, Palestinians were given 
aid because they (except for Hamas and smaller political movements) behaved well and 
adjusted to Western policies.  
 
The idea of compensation was very close to the ‘reward’ notion. Palestinians made huge 
sacrifices in the past, which were recognized and compensated for in the present. These 
sacrifices were manifold. According to our respondents, donors either paid for their historical 
mistakes (for example the UK for the Balfour Declaration, the UN for the Partition Plan) or 
for not having confronted Israel for decades: ‘the US has to compensate us for supporting the 
bully and hurting us in this matter; most Europeans cannot fight Israel politically.’16  
 
Since ‘fighting Israel in public is political and professional suicide,’ the US and the other 
donors were paying the bill. Even if ‘[t]hey feel bad about the situation, they will not change 
their policies. They cannot but support Israel, so they give the Palestinians money to offset 
Israeli wrongdoings. Foreign aid cannot but finance the occupation as long as donors pay [a 
sort of restitution] for the damages caused by Israeli citizens or by the army.’17 
 
Historical experiences with Western countries made up an integral part of the Palestinian 
collective memory. Great powers — and those that are less significant powers, but happen to 
be members of the developed world — were held responsible for the Middle East crises. 
Acknowledging their responsibility on the one hand and led by their nation-state interests on 
the other, the West has been providing aid to the Palestinian people for more than six decades. 
 
16 Interview with the director of a research centre, Bethlehem, August 2, 2010. 
17 Interview, ??? kivel??? 
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4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
While the initial research aimed at identifying the sentiments and perceptions experienced by 
the Palestinians (Paragi 2010), this paper only attempted to reflect the most important 
impressions and feelings attached to foreign aid as well as its perceived roles and functions. 
The main questions of the research were: how do Palestinians think about international, 
understood as Western, assistance and why Palestinians think the way they do. To identify the 
main trends both quantitative and qualitative methods were used. The form of interviews was 
chosen because they offered the simplest way to understand what and how people think abut 
this specific issue. While the method of public opinion poll was quite strict regarding the 
formulation of questions as well as the opinions for responses (Fafo 2010a), the qualitative 
interviews offered more flexibility to explore the structure of Palestinian perceptions on 
international assistance (Fafo 2010b; Paragi 2010). Related to the results of the qualitative 
interviews, two general features should be mentioned. First, even if some original or authentic 
thoughts could be discovered upon analyzing the data, most of the recorded arguments 
recalled what could be read in the scientific literature and newspaper articles. Second, it must 
also be acknowledged that most of the respondents were not familiar with facts. They could 
recognize and identify the general trends, but particular details of the policies and 
implementation of international assistance were not known to the majority.  
 
Impressions and sentiments as well as roles and functions of foreign aid as perceived by the 
recipient were among the novel findings of the research. It must be emphasized that 
Palestinians were at a loss to explain and assess the advantages and disadvantages of foreign 
aid. On the one hand it was emphasized that Palestinians were simply forced to betray their 
most important national goals and dreams by accepting foreign aid. Access to Western aid 
was seen as conditional on their ‘unconditional’ support for the overall goal, namely the Oslo 
peace process and a two-state solution. As long as Palestinian recipients shared the donors’ 
norms and values and/or their understanding of peace process, they received aid. When 
compliance with Western conditions was refused, as the case of Hamas proved, access to aid 
was denied. Due to this conditionality, foreign aid was perceived to bolster the intra-
Palestinian conflict between Hamas and Fatah. On the other hand they did not really know 
what else to expect from the donors except receiving more aid. Although foreign aid officially 
aimed at supporting the peace process, it was perceived widely as a means for maintaining in 
practice what should be eliminated in principle, namely the Israeli occupation. Since donors 
were perceived as being aware of it, Palestinians could not but conclude that Western donors 
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provided foreign aid either for realizing alternative political goals or for their conscience's 
sake.  
 
Most important terms and concepts  
Many in Palestine thought that the Palestinians have become the ‘victim of the victims’ since 
World War II and argued that the ‘West pays’, because ‘it must pay’ for this situation. Since 
the donors did not try to tackle the real roots of the problem by political means, they were 
looked upon as ‘hypocrite’ players. Many respondents expressed frustration over external aid 
that only ‘financed and prolonged the occupation.’ They argued that Western aid combined 
with ongoing Israeli occupation just made Palestine highly ‘dependent on external sources’ 
not only raising Palestinian defencelessness, but also facilitating the import of goods and 
services into the Palestinian territories. Palestinians could not but spend their salaries (covered 
by foreign aid) on products imported from and via Israel in absence of proper alternatives. 
However, it was rarely taken into consideration that any, even the huge Palestinian import 
surplus could be financed by three main sources: foreign loans, private investment and, as the 
Palestinian case also shows, unilateral transfers – donations. 
 
While our respondents acknowledged that the West, honestly or not so honestly, was trying to 
help the Palestinian people build a state, the ‘conditions’ attached to foreign aid were 
understood as a means for ‘controlling the Palestinian aspirations’ by ‘creating dependency’ 
(Paragi 2012). And, according to the respondents, even if the donors will keep providing aid 
to the Palestinians in the future, none of the main problems such as the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict and the Palestinian disunity will be easier to solve by accepting foreign aid. 
 
Geographical differences of perceptions 
The results revealed some interesting variation in the way of thinking between those living in 
the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. International assistance was perceived in a much more 
positive manner in the Gaza Strip. West Bankers were more outspoken when talking about 
foreign aid and its (political) (side)effects. Hardships and constrained access to information 
made respondents more cautious in formulating their thoughts in Gaza, where foreign aid was 
perceived to be a necessity and was seen as a good thing, a sort of help and support. 
Respondents in Ramallah and Bethlehem were much more concerned with criticizing the 
policy and practice of foreign aid. Here, the ‘official’ or ‘nominal’ function of aid, namely 
help, was barely mentioned. International assistance was seen to be more just and more 
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effective than any domestic form of assistance. In the Gaza Strip, it was considered less 
selective in terms of political preferences than indigenous assistance. Respondents in the West 
Bank were more concerned with the political (peace) conditions attached to foreign aid than 
with the selectivity of domestic assistance. Corruption was considered to be worse in Gaza 
where respondents reported an increasing trend having been observed since 2007. Last but not 
least, while Fayyad was widely accused of ‘diverting people’s attention from resistance to 
economic development by giving them international money’ in the West Bank, respondents in 
Gaza did not see any contradiction between economic progress or prosperity on the one hand, 
and resistance to Israeli occupation on the other. According to Gazans they can – what is 
more, they should – go hand-in-hand. 
 
As the research shows, supporting the peace process is sort of a vicious cycle. Israelis and 
Palestinians have been engaged in a legally obscure situation, somewhere between self-
determination and occupation since 1993. As the perceptions reflect, foreign aid cannot but 
comply with the framework defined by the Oslo Accords, after all its overall goal has been 
declared as ‘supporting the peace process.’ All this implies that frustration with the ongoing 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict embraces donor policies and practices too – regardless of the fact 
that the effects and efficiency of foreign aid can be questioned on many other basis and in 
many other countries too. The main conclusion that may be drawn from reviewing Palestinian 
perceptions and sentiments is that foreign aid can by no means be treated as an ‘independent 
variable.’ Donors are perceived as active players being able to influence not just political or 
institutional processes, but hurting the collective and individual self-esteem of the recipient as 
well. Standing always at the ‘recipient end’ of the aid relationship makes the beneficiaries feel 
humiliated and unequal not only at the community (people, nation, nation-state) level, but as 
human beings too. Since foreign aid cannot be refused for various reasons, the only 
alternative to escape from this trap and to save ‘the illusion of equality’ is reciprocating 
somehow the aid received. It can be done by accepting the rules of the game. But complying 
with the conditions set by the donors implies surrender of domestic notions of ‘justice’ and 
‘national aspirations,’ which can lead to further deterioration in collective and individual self-
esteem – as perceived by our respondents.  
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